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KEEPING ANIMAL SPIRITS ASLEEP: The Case of Chile 




Chilean legislation is quite conservative, especially compared with international 
practice. However, its application has not been free of criticism, and it proved necessary to 
seek mechanisms that combine limitations set forth in the GATT/WTO regulations and 
others self-imposed by Chilean law. 
 
Legislation on anti-dumping measures was introduced in Chile in 1992.  The 
Distortions Commission has recommended and the President has adopted such measures 
on just six occasions, of which two correspond to extensions of existing measures. 
Legislation on safeguard measures was introduced in 1999. In the 1999 – 2002 period, 
sevensafeguard measures were adopted. The traditional agricultural sector was the main 
user of the measures, and no measure was in place for more than 12 months.  
 
The context in which the Commission was created in 1981 and the type of 
measures adopted by this entity support the idea that the objective of the Commission was 
to alleviate the political pressures generated by the difficult economic situation rather than 
to correct problems originated by the “price distortions of goods.” In the second half of the 
1980’s, the Commission supported the liberalization process that started in 1985. Adopting 
safeguard legislation in 1999 helped to gain approval of further tariff reductions from 11% 
to 6%.  
 
During the decade of the 1990’s and until the present day, the philosophy of 
minimal use to further liberalization has been maintained. The legislation has undergone 
modifications to adjust the instruments used to support the economic opening and 
international commitments.   3
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The multilateral trading system has defined the instruments that can be adopted by the 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), under certain conditions, to correct 
trade distortions (subsidies and dumping practices),and to prevent the damage that a 
sudden increase of  imports may cause. These instruments have been part of trade 
regimes since the end of the 19
th century and the beginning of the 20
th century.   
 
The thesis presented in this chapter is that the political economy of contingent 
trade protection demands at least an institutional regime that will significantly reduce the 
possibility that these instruments be captured by private interests or the economic or 
political context of a country. At the same time, under certain conditions, experience 
indicates that these instruments can be a useful tool to support economic opening, as they 
offer society mechanisms that can temporarily alleviate and/or facilitate the adjustment that 
a sector may need in the transition to the new context of economic  liberalization. 
 
  This paper examines the origin, evolution and operation of the adoption of 
safeguard measures and anti-dumping duties in Chile. The first section studies the 
evolution of legislation from 1981 to the present. The second section examines the 
measures adopted and the sectors which have benefited from them. The third section 
analyzes how the Distortions Commission works. Finally, the fourth section presents an 
assessment of the performance of the Chilean system,and examines proposals for 
improvement.  
 
                                                 
• The author would like to acknowledge J. Michael Finger and Julio J. Nogués for their invitation to 
participate in this project. The author would also like to acknowledge the comments of Diana Tussie 
and the participants of the seminar where a preliminary version of this paper was discussed. During 
the preparation of this paper, useful comments from several experts were received, in particular 
from Juan S. Araya, Alvaro Espinoza, and Ambassador Alejandro Jara, who intently and patiently 
read the paper and made suggestions that contributed to improve it. Evelyn Caserio collaborated in 
the research of basic and statistical background data. As is usual, all errors or omissions are the 
author’s sole responsibility.   
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I.  The Development of Chilean Legislation on Unfair Competition 
 
For a number of reasons, Chile’s trade policy reform process differs from that of the rest of 
Latin America. In the first place, this process started at the end of 1973, earlier than in the 
rest of the region. This gives reforms a degree of maturity that contributes to the stability of 
trade policy and the continuous opening process that the economy has experienced in the 
context of democracy. Secondly, these reforms took place in the context of a military 
regime that did not need to seek support to enforce its policies. Neither did it give the 
public any explanation for the negative consequences that reforms had at  the begining. 
Therefore, it was not necessary to create instruments that would temporarily alleviate their 
effects, or to establish mechanisms that would promote a gradual adjustment to the new 
conditions. In the third place, the Chilean trade reform is characterized by its wide scale 
and speed. In fact, as graph 1 shows, in June 1979 tariffs decreased from an average of 
over 90% to a uniform 10% level. Additionally, the currency exchange was fixed for nearly 
3 years from June 1979 to mid 1982, a period during which economic policy adopted  the  
monetary approach to the balance of payments. All this took place in a context where the 
set of trade policy instruments in force in September 1973 was disassembled at the same 
time as tariffs were reduced (quotas, prohibitions, advance deposits, among others). 
Besides, trade opening took place and was a key piece in the macro-economic 
stabilization process launched by authorities. Finally, it is important to take into account 
that Chile’s trade reform process is part of a larger scale institutional transformation 
process, which coherently encompassed diverse aspects of Chilean society such as its 
political regime, the role of the state in the economy, the general economic framework, and 
social policies as they had developed throughout the 20
th century. 































































































































































































































































































































































































Graph 1: Tariffs and Real Exchange Rate, 1973-2003 
 
*RER: real exchange rate 
Sources: Tariffs: French-Davis (1980), Meller (1996) and the author’s analysis. Real exchange 
rate provided by R. French-Davis, following calculus methodologies described in French-Davis 
(2003). 
 
Although in 1973 protection was initially very high, at the end of the unilateral   
liberalization process, when the tariff level reached 10%, it could have been justified to 
introduce contingent protection instruments to support the adopted policy. Nevertheless, 
this only happened during the great economic crisis  of 1982. 
In the framework of the trade negotiations of the Tokyo Round, Chile signed the 
GATT Subsidy Code, because the existence of subsididized imports was considered to be 
the only situation that justified a temporary protection in favor of the domestic industry. 
Conversely, the economic rationale of safeguard measures was less sustainable. Besides, 
in their original form these measures contemplated compensations for the countries 
affected by them, which  discouraged their application.  Finally, it was considered that in 
an open economy, anti-dumping duties could lead to protectionist measures that would 
favor sectors that might feel affected by the opening and could have political influence to 
get protection. Besides, they did not have a solid economic basis.    6
Table 1: The Development of Legislation, 1981-2000 
YEAR  GATT/WTO  LAW 
RESPONSIBLE 
ENTITY  INSTRUMENTS 
1981  Subsidies Code/Tokyo 
Round/ GATT 1947 
Decree  
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CA; MCV; surcharges; 
anti-dumping duties. 





CA; MCV, surcharges; 
anti-dumping duties 
1999 WTO  Law 






 Source: Diario Oficial, several issues. 
Note: In 1999, both MCV and surcharges were removed from Chilean legislation.  
 
In October 1981, the Subsidies Commission was created and installed in Chile’s 
Central Bank (BCCH). Its role was related to initiating, conducting and concluding 
investigations on subsidized imports, and to submit its conclusions to the Ministry of 
Finance, which could use them to adopt compensatory adjustments in the form of  “tariff 
surcharges” which consisted in an increase in the tariff up to the maximum level of 35% 
consolidated by Chile in the Tokyo Round. Likewise, the Commission was entitled to 
recommend the adoption of minimum customs values (MCV). 
In an attempt to increase its representativeness, at the end of 1985 the composition 
of the Subsidies Commission was modified to include members from the Ministries of 
Economy and Foreign Affairs, the National Customs Service and the  anti-trust authority 
(Fiscal Nacional Económico, FNE). The Commission continued to be chaired by the BCCH 
(see Table 1).  
In 1986, Law N° 18,525 was passed. It created the “National Commission for 
Investigations on Imports Price Distortions”
1, known as the National Commission for Price 
                                                 
1 Before Law 18,525, article 186 of Law 16,464 delegated the faculty to suspend, reduce or raise 
customs duties to the President of Chile. As from the entry in effect of the Constitution of 1980   7
Distortions (CNDP, or the Commission). It coexisted with the Subsidies Commission, 
which was based in the BCCH and as said, investigated applications against subsidies. 
Instead, the new Commission had a wider scope of action as it focused on “price 
distortions”.  Finally, with the promulgation of Law 18,840 in 1989, the constitutional 
organic law of the BCCH which established the substantive provisions over this institution 
and implemented the autonomy set forth in the Constitution of 1980, and Law N° 18,908 of 
January 1990, both commissions  were merged. An important change introduced was the 
faculty to initiate  an investigation without having received a written application by or on 
behalf of a domestic industry.  
The National Commission was thus constituted in the general terms as it operates 
at present, by two representatives from the BCCH, one representative from the Minister of  
Finance, one representative from the Minister of Economy, one representative from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Director of the National Customs Service and the  and the 
Head of  FNE, who chairs it
2. In 1995, by means of a Law, a representative from the 
Ministry of Agriculture also joined the Commission. The Technical Secretariat of the 
Commission, which is in charge of conducting investigations on price distortions, is based 
in the BCCH.  
  At the beginning of the 1990’s, authorities foresaw that in the context of the 
Uruguay Round and the possibility of subscribing the Customs Valuation Code or a 
successive agreement, MCV could not continue to be applied to correct “price distortions”. 
Besides, in a context in which continuous trade opening was foreseen - through unilateral 
liberalization or trade agreements- this instrument and the tariff surcharges would 
disappear as contingent protection.  
Therefore, Law N° 19,155 of August 13th 1992 entitled the Commission to 
recommend authorities to adopt anti-dumping duties and discontinue practices with less 
adequate instruments such as surcharges and MCV. This modification was opposed by 
orthodox economists, who, from a theoretical standpoint, correctly argued that in an open 
economy such as Chile’s it would be impossible for a company to practice dumping since it 
would not be able to permanently hold a leading market position and would experience 
mid-term losses if it kept this strategy. On the other hand, there were sectors that 
                                                                                                                                                     
establishing the legal reserve principle, the duty (both the rate and the substantial elements that 
determine it) should be established by law, and this action cannot be delegated to the 
administrative authority. 
 
2 FNE is in charge of investigating actions against market competition, and of submitting its findings 
to the relevant authorities.   8
considered that it was very difficult to continue with the liberalization process  if properly 
regulated escape clauses subject to disciplines to control the application of this type of 
measure were not contemplated.  
Finally, Law N ° 19,612, which was approved in May 31 1999, gave the President 
of Chile the possibility to adopt safeguard measures in compliance with article XIX of 
GATT and the corresponding WTO Agreement based on a report from the Distortions 
Commission. The legislation incorporated the form of adopting safeguard measures in 
compliance with the provisions of some bilateral agreements signed by Chile. At the same 
time, the possibility of adopting surcharges in the terms contemplated by the original law 
and MCV was eliminated.  
 
II.  The Application of Measures through Time 
 
As Graph 2 indicates, the first version of the Commission was very active. According to the 
data available for the period between October 1981 and December 1985, 155 applications 
were submitted to the Commission, an investigation was conducted  for 90 cases (58%), 
and definitive measures were adopted for 47 cases investigated - 52% or 30% of the 
applications originally made (see Graph 1 and Finger,1987).  
 
Of the measures adopted, 76% were tariff surcharges and 22% were MCV. 
Concerning the sectors protected, the textile sector was predominant with 37% of the 
measures (all of them surcharges), followed by electrical products (8%), and metal 
mechanics (7%), see Table 2
3.  
 
In the 1981-1990 period, the difficulties generated by the  requirements of the 
GATT Code – especially the requirement of the existence of a subsidy – and the fear of 
retaliation from the trade partners affected by Chile’s measures, explain why the 
instrument that was most frequently used by authorities was tariff surcharges
4. The 
adoption of this instrument arose from the sovereign decision to modify tariffs up to a 
                                                 
3 These numbers refer to the 1981-1987 period. See Banco Central de Chile (2003) and 
www.cndp.cl . 
 
4 In fact, in some cases there were Latin American countries that expressed their intention to adopt 
disguised restrictions if Chile adopted countervailing duties against their exports, as they 
considered that such a measure would lead developed countries to react against them.  
   9
consolidated maximum of 35% without infringing GATT obligations
5, although an 
investigation proving injury or threat thereof was necessary in order to adopt measures. 
The same requirement applied to the adoption of MCVs.  
 





Source: Central Bank of Chile and www.cndp.cl , and Graph 1. 
 
From the point of view  of resource allocation, these measures -surcharges and 
MCV- were inefficient, as they affected imports independently of their origin or whether 
their prices were distorted or not. Consequently, it was presumed that there was a 
“distortion” in international markets in general and companies were forced to choose more 
expensive suppliers. Besides, when these measures were applied to intermediate goods, 
the effective protection of the final good was affected. However, apart from the domestic 
                                                 
5 In the relevant section, Article 10 pointed out that “3 per cent, 5 per cent, 8 per cent, 10 per cent, 12 
per cent, 15 per cent, 18 per cent and 20 per cent surcharges should be established ad valorem”.... 
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context, it is important to take into account the international context, which explains the 
type of measures adopted by authorities. In fact, Latin America was facing a serious 
economic crisis and many countries, especially those with the largest relative size, 
maintained subsidies that made it difficult to target the measures on certain origins as they 
created incentives to deviate imports from those countries that were not affected by the  
protective measures. This reduced the effectiveness of the measures adopted.   
In the 1986 – 1992 period, tariff surcharges were applied in 41% of the 
investigations that concluded with recommendations, MCV in 53% and countervailing 
duties in just 6% (www.cndp.cl). Except for one case, it is worth noting, however, that 
countervailing duties were often applied only between 1990 and 1992. The use of MCV 
was aimed to “punish” imports whose prices were more “distorted.” Thus, the goal was to 
soften the impact of protection, as it was applied independently of origin and it affected 
mainly those imports whose prices were more “distorted”, or in other words, lower.  During 
this period, a sensitive reduction of the number of applications submitted to the 
Commission is observed, although the number of applications and investigations 
increased as tariffs were lowered (1985 and 1988). This shows that these measures 
served as a temporary deviation from the liberalization policy. Or rather they supported the 
opening, as they gave an option to the sectors that were more sensitive or reluctant to this 
policy. With the return of democracy in 1990, there was an important increase in the 
number of applications, probably with the expectation that in the new political context 
authorities would be more inclined to grant protection. When this failed to happen, 
applications and investigations decreased again in 1991 and 1992 (see Graph 2).  
Concerning the sectors that resorted to these instruments, the predominant ones 
continued to be textiles with 55% of the measures adopted, dairy products (10%), metals 
and metal mechanics (10%), and electrical products (7%) (see Table 2). 
  In the period from 1993, when this type of measure is introduced, to 1997, only 6 
anti-dumping duties were adopted but more recently between 1998 and 2003, no new 
measures have been implemented. Between 1993 and 1998 tariff surcharges were not 
adopted. There were only four MCV in 1993 and 1994, and only one countervailing duty. 
Between 1999 and 2003 there were seven safeguard measures adopted. Since 2002 only 
one application has been submitted for safeguards against fructose imports and there 
have not been  new investigations. Summing up, during the 1990’s and in recent years, 
the Commission faced relatively lower levels of activity.   11
It is useful to try to understand which variables explain the evolution of the 
investigations performed by the Commission. For that purpose, we have undertaken a 
simple econometric regression where the dependent variable is a logarithm of the 
applications submitted and the independent variables are a constant, the logarithm of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) and the real exchange rate (RER) of the previous period. A 
dummy variable was included from 1999 to 2002, when the safeguard legislation was 




(1)   LAPPLICATIONS= 57,70391  -1,147683 LRER (-1)  -3,007096 LGDP (1) + 1.069985 DU 99 




2: 0,859129  
R
2 adjusted: 0,834270 
 
As it is reflected by the results of the regression,  the applications submitted are a 
function of GDP and the RER lagged one year. The elasticity of the previous year’s GDP is 
3 and of the real exchange rate, 1.14 are statistically significant.  The positive sign of the 
dummy variable, indicates that the introduction of safeguards had created expectations of 
a change of regime. This is reflected in the number of applications submitted after the 
legislation was approved (12 applications in 1999). However, this is not validated by the 
behavior of the Commission, which adopts 5 safeguard measures between 1999 and 
2000.  
 
(2)  LINITIATED= 48,45148   -2,711487 LGDP (1)  -0,211594 LRER (1) + 0,724832 DU 99 




2: 0,713528  
R
2 adjusted: 0,665783 
 
This exercise was also performed using initiations as the dependent variable. In 
this case, the RER is not a relevant variable as the measures adopted are better explained 
by the GDP behavior of the previous year. In relation to the behavior of the Commission , 
this can indicate that the expectations of those who seek protection due to the appreciation 
of the RER are not validated.  The dummy variable continues to be significant, which again   12
indicates an expectation that the Commission would change its policy. Specifically, once 
the legislation was approved, the Commission tended to initiate an important fraction of the 
applications, and on three occasions the Comission  self-initiated investigations (of a total 
of 15 from 1990 to 2002), thus validating a possible change of policy. Nevertheless, later 
this expecation was frustrated by the low number of measures adopted.  
   13
Table 2: Definitive Measures of the National Commission for Price Distortions and Sectors Affected 
Sector\Measure  Tariff Surcharges Minimum Customs Values       Countervailing   Anti-dumping
  Duties Duties
 1981-1987   1986-1989 1990-2002(a) 1981-1987 1986-1989  1990-2002 (b)  1981-1987 1986-1989  1990-2002  1990-2002 (c))
Agriculture  0  0 5 1 0 1  0 0 1 1
Food products  3  0 1 3 0 0  0 0 0 0
Electrical, mechanical     
or fuel products  5  0 0 0 1 1  0 0 1 0
Capital goods  0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Leather and shoes  1  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 1
Forestry, paper and wood  0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Dairy products  3  3 2 1 2 4  0 0 2 0
Metals and metal mechanics  4  0 1 0 3 1  0 0 0 2
Mining 2  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Tires, rubber and plastics  1  4 1 1 3 1  0 0 0 0
Fishing 1  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0
Chemicals  2  1 0 5 0 0  0 0 0 2
Textiles  22  6 4 0 14 8  0 0 2 0
Glass and ceramics  3  0 0 1 0 0  1 0 0 0
   Total 47  14 14 12 23 16  1 0 6 6
Source: Central Bank of Chile (2003), www.cndp.cl
 
 
Note:  : 
In 2003, there were no investigations and no measures of any kind were adopted.
a) As from 1999, surcharges correspond to safeguard measures. The former system of surcharges up to a 35% level was eliminated;
b) As from 1999, MCV were removed from Chilean legislation;
c)  Before 1992, anti-dumping duties were not 
applied.   14
 
III.  The Operation of the National Commission for Price Distortions (CNDP)  
 
The role of the CNDP is to “acknowledge” applications against price distortions on 
imported merchandise.  To proceed with the application, an investigation must be 
undertaken. The Commission is to publish the initiation date of the investigation and its 
subject matter in the Official Bulletin (Diario Oficial) within five working days after the 
application is submitted. The Commission has to receive the background data that the 
interested parties want to submit, and request the necessary reports within 30 days after 
the application is published. Upon request from the interested parties and before 
presenting its conclusions, the Commission is to hold a public hearing. 
  The Commission is entitled to carry out  ex-oficio investigations when the data 
available justifies it. In these cases the procedure followed is the same as for cases 
initiated through an application. The stages in the investigations and their development are 
in accordance with the general guidelines of WTO agreements (see Table 3). 
It is the President of the country, through the Minister of Finance, who finally 
determines which products will be subject to measures, their amount and duration, in 
accordance with the matter investigated and the report of the Commission
6. This provision 
would imply that the President can follow the recommendations on the measures 
presented by the Commission or not. However, if the President adopts a measure, it 
cannot be more restrictive than the one recommended by the Commission. For example, if 
the Commission recommends that a 10% anti-dumping duty should be adopted, the 
President is entitled to apply a lower duty or one equal to 10%. Likewise,  a measure can 
be extended for an additional year, without a limit of years, provided a previous de novo 
investigation is conducted by the Distortions Commission to recommend maintaining the 
measure or modifying it.  The request for renewal must be made by one of the interested 
parties in the case of safeguards, or it can be a decision of the Commission in the case of 
dumping and subsidies. In the latter case, the request for renewal triggers a  ex-oficio 
investigation.  
                                                 
6 According to the Chilean Constitution, duties can be established or modified only by means of a 
law proposed by the Executive Power and approved by the Parliament. In this case, articles 9 and 
11 of Law 18,525 establish the duties and requirements that they must fulfill for their application.  
The responsibility of the President is only to confirm compliance with these requirements through a 




1 year - Maximum 18 months in exceptional cases. * 90 days *
15 days to make comments or observations. Immediately after taking a measure
30 days 30 days
- -
60 days * 30 days *
4 months and 6 months in exceptional cases 200 days at the most.
* Timeframe as from the publication of the initiation of an investigation in the Official Bulletin (D.O).
Safeguard measures can be extended only once for a period that cannot exceed one
year. 
This request has to be made at least 30 days before the expiration of the original term.
Measures can be extended after a request is made and a new investigation.
Is conducted. Extension of definitive measures
In situ visits 
When an investigation is initiated, the authorities of the exporting Member 
and all companies known to be interested in carrying out in situ
investigations should be informed.
 
-
1 year as from publication in the Official Bulletin if there have not been provisional 
measures. If provisional measures have been applied, the one year period is counted
As from the date of publication of the decree that instructs the application 
 
of these measures.
1 year as from publication in the Official Bulletin. According to current





The Distortions Commission gives public notice of all preliminary or definitive determinations, positive or negative
and of the termination of an investigation.
Public notice of determinations
Once an investigation is finished. They become effective as from the moment they are published in the Official Bulleting of the corresponding decree.
Once the initiation of an investigation is notified, the Distortions Commission makes the complete text of the public version
of the application available to all interested parties involved.
Access to information related to the investigation
The Distortions Commission fixes the date, time and venue
of the hearing and notifies interested parties in writing.
The latter must communicate their intention to attend in writing
up to within the third working day before the hearing
Hearings
The date, time and venue of the hearing must be included in the notice
of initiation of investigations that is published in D. O. 
The parties who wish to attend must communicate their intention in writing 




Recommendation of provisional measures
Recommendation of definitive measures









Initiation of investigation and timeframes 
Table 3: Investigation Procedure and Stages   16
   The law that created the Distortions Commission has been modified to incorporate 
the WTO agreements: new measures were added (safeguards) and others were 
eliminated (surcharges and MCV). However, the concept that the Commission is in charge 
of investigating “price distortions on imports” and that it is also responsible for safeguards, 
subsidies and dumping investigations has been kept. The question arises if there are 
“other distortions” on the prices of merchandise sold on international markets besides 
those mentioned here that should also be investigated by this Commission. Likewise, the 
coexistence of the terminology of the original law, including its timeframes, and of decrees 
that regulate the operation of the Commission and have not been updated with the 
provisions of WTO agreements – the ones that should prevail when investigations are 
conducted - could bring about some ambiguity and confusion.    
A point that draws  attention when   studying the Chilean legislation is the double 
role that the BCCH plays . In fact, the BCCH acts as a member of the Commission with 2 
representatives (25% of the members) and at the same time, is responsible for its 
Technical Secretariat. In the latter capacity, the BCCH is in charge of conducting 
investigations and submitting to the Commission a report in which all the evidence 
gathered is analyzed. This double role has been maintained since the Chilean system was 
created. In 1989, when the Organic Constitutional Law of the BCCH, which gave legal 
expression to the constitutional norm that established its autonomy was passed, the role of 
the BCCH as the Technical Secretariat of the Distortions Commission was maintained 
even though this entity was giving up almost all its functions in trade policy.  
There are two reasons that can explain this decision. In the first place, there was  a 
concern that the new democratic regime would be very sensitive to pressures from sectors 
that would demand trade protection
7. Conversely, the BCCH would be less permeable to 
them by keeping a technical approach to investigations. Its weight in the Commission 
provided a balance that supported an “exclusively technical” approach.  
In the second place, there is a budgetary issue, as transferring the functions of the 
Technical Secretariat to another public entity implied the need to provide it with the means 
and the technical training to perform this function. At present, the Technical Secretariat has 
sufficient budget to conduct investigations initiated by the Commission through 
applications or ex-oficio, as it is part of the functional structure of the BCCH. This budget 
                                                 
7 In fact, the number of applications submitted in 1990 proves that there was an expectation in this 
sense. 
    17
allows the Technical Secretariat to pay higher market remunerations than the public 
sector, to hire additional full time or part time professionals when needed, to commission 
external studies – what has not been necessary so far – to carry out in situ visits, and in 
general, to access all the local and international statistical information that is necessary to 
conduct an investigation.  
The Technical Secretariat is formed by a small group of professionals who are in 
charge of conducting investigations. These professionals also have other roles inside the 
Department of Trade Policy of the BCCH, which reports to the Department of International 
Exchanges and Trade Policy. The work of the Secretariat is defined as exclusively 
technical, of low profile and protected by the global institutionality of the BCCH. Thus, the 
political and public pressures that in many cases is excercisedduring investigations falls 
mainly on the members of the Commission, particularly on the representatives of 
Ministries, who adopt recommendations on the basis of the investigations performed by 
the Technical Secretariat. However, the law does not prevent Commission members from 
contributing additional evidence in the course of the investigation or during deliberations. 
One of the functions of the Technical Secretariat is to explain to the interested 
parties the legal requirements of the WTO and of local laws that must be fulfilled to initiate 
and conduct an investigation. Another one is to analyze the evidence provided by the 
parties and to gather all the necessary information to prepare the technical report that is 
submitted to the Commission. The Technical Secretariat is also responsible for compliance 
with all the legal requirements of the WTO and Chilean legislation. The Technical 
Secretariat does not perform dissemination activities of its work, although it participates in 
seminars and other activities to which its members are invited to discuss aspects of 
Chilean law and of international legislations of general interest.  
Throughout the years, the autonomy of the BCCH has been consolidated and its 
credibility in conducting monetary and exchange rate policies has been strengthened. 
Consequently, there have not been serious proposals to move the Secretariat out of this 
institution.    18
a.  The Application of Anti-dumping Duties 
 
Since the legislation on anti-dumping measures was introduced, the Distortions 
Commission has recommended and the President has adopted this type of measure on 
just six occasions, out of which two correspond to extensions of existing measures (see 
Table 4). Chilean legislation takes the provisions of the WTO Agreement, which are “fully 
incorporated in (our) national legislation, and are therefore Chilean law in each and every 
part.”
8  
Both Chilean legislation and the practice followed in investigations so far have 
maintained stricter and more restrictive criteria than those contemplated in the 
corresponding WTO agreements and in most member country legislations. In fact, 
measures have a duration of one year, and can only be extended through a previous de 
novo investigation. Furthermore, in the investigations that have been conducted so far, the 
following parameters have been applied
9:  
i.  The measure recommended to correct dumping takes into consideration the 
injury margin instead of the dumping margin;  
ii.  The injury margin is calculated, in general, on the basis of the prices of other 
competitors and not on the basis of domestic prices
10;  
iii. When calculating dumping margins on the basis of the domestic price of 
imports in the country of origin, sales below cost price are not excluded which 
reduces the dumping margin;  
iv.  The investigation is not always carried out against all imports from the origin 
reported in the application, but only against imports from the companies 
reported, although there are only some examples of this criterion;  
v.  The approach applied favors the determination of the causal relationship 
between the existence of dumping and the damage instead of analyzing simple 
correlations (one-track  versus two-track approach); and 
vi.  Neither anti-elusion nor retroactive measures are applied.   
                                                 
8 Responses given by the Government of Chile before the WTO. See G/ADP/W/156, G/SCM/W/163, 
November 28, 1995.  
9 See Peña (2001) for an analysis of the practical application of the provisions of the Antidumping 
Agreement in Chilean legislation.  
10 The technical criterion applied is the “non-dumped import price method”. The “best information 
available” has not been frequently used and so far, the possibility of negotiating price agreements 
has not been applied either.  
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Nevertheless,  the current practice used to assess the dumping cases could be 
modified by the Commission itself and consequently in a favorable atmosphere, this 
instrument could become a tool with a protectionist orientation. Therefore, it is necessary 
to seek mechanisms to ensure that the actual practice is consolidated. Even though it is 
not possible to establish full guarantees that a restrictive approach will be maintained, the 
role played by the leadership of the economic authorities responsible for conducting trade 
policy is important to maintain the actual orientation of this instrument.  
In the  context of its bilateral trade negotiations, Chile has sought to eliminate the 
application of anti-dumping measures, as the government has considered that their use is 
a protection mechanism rather than an instrument that will correct dumping practices (see 
Peña 2001, and Finger 1993).  In the framework of the existing free trade agreement with 
Canada, both countries have agreed to eliminate anti-dumping measures in reciprocal   20
trade. Likewise, the free trade agreement signed with the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA), which is actually in the approval process in the respective Parliaments, eliminated 
the application of anti-dumping duties. However, these measures have not been replaced 
by the application of legislation on competition as is proposed by some authors. On the 
other hand, concerning the application of anti-dumping measures to third countries, both 
parties have the possibility to follow the procedures established by their legislation. In other 
words, criteria on the application of legislation were not harmonized. This is an advantage 
as it allows the continuation of a more restricted approach for the application of measures, 
instead of introducing complex and difficult procedures which are not related to the 
economic rationale of the instrument (see Peña, 2001).   
 
b.  The Application of Safeguard Measures 
 
  After the Economic Complementation Agreement with MERCOSUR and the Free 
Trade Agreement between Chile and Canada were signed, there was a debate on the 
trade diversion effects that these two agreements given the country’s “relatively” high 
most-favored-nation rates. The Executive proposed to reduce the uniform applied rate 
from  11%  to 6% in a period of 5 years. As part of the negotiation with the Congress, it 
was agreed that the legislation to adopt safeguard measures in compliance with Article XIX 
of GATT 1994 and the WTO Safeguards Agreement would be submitted.  
This situation tends to favor the hypothesis that in the case of Chile, safeguard 
measures, as well as the use of measures in the decade of the 1980’s, have 
complemented and supported the tariff reduction that took place in the second half of the 
1990’s. In other words, unilateral tariff reductions are accepted as long as there are 
protections for contingencies. The same happens in the trade negotiation processes in 
which temporary alleviation mechanisms are introduced.  
Together with the adoption of safeguard legislation, the possibility to apply 
surcharges below the WTO bound tariff level, which are subject to less strict disciplines, 
and to apply MCV was eliminated. Finally, in agreement with the provisions of the treaties 
negotiated by Chile, the application of safeguards (bilateral or multilateral) was regulated.  
The approved legislation is restrictively applied with respect to the provisions of 
Article XIX and the WTO Safeguards Agreement: when the recommended safeguard 
measure surpasses the WTO 25% bound tariff, approval by the Distortions Commissions 
requires a special quorum equivalent to three-quarters of the members of the Commission.   21
Additionally, safeguard meausres can only be ad-valorem tariffs and the legislation does 
not contemplate the application of quotas or specific duties. Likewise, safeguard measures 
can only be in force for a maximum period of one year, including the effective period of 
provisional measures. Safeguard measures can be extended for an additional one-year 
period provided a previous de novo investigation requested by the interested party 
accredits that the requirements of the Safeguards Agreement are fulfilled. In the case of an 
extension, a gradual dismantling schedule is established unless there are exceptional 
circumstances properly qualified by the Commission. To request the renewal of safeguards 
of a given product, no measures should have been applied for a period of two years
11. 
However, this limitation is not explicitly established in the law that authorized the 
application of safeguards but it is derived from the provisions of the WTO Safeguards 
Agreement. In our view, these situations not explicitly contemplated in the law are a source 
of confusion when evaluating the framework of application of measures in Chile.   
Furthermore, the bilateral agreements have established other limitations to the 
application of these measures, which add exceptions to them. Thus, safeguards have   
become more complex in terms of their application, administration and surveillance, and 
they are less effective. 
Table 5 shows some of the rules on measures
12. The first rule refers to temporary 
bilateral safeguards that exclusively affect trade between the parties and are normally 
applied during the  liberalization period: once the  tariff elimination program concludes, 
they cannot be applied except with the authorization of the affected party. A second 
category of safeguards introduced in treaties is aimed to address the situation of more 
politically sensitive sectors. In particular, this has been the case of the agricultural and 
textile sectors, where the Chilean counterpart has demanded the safeguards. For both 
sectors there are rules that the countries need to follow before a measure is applied
13 and 
there are limits on the type of measures that can be applied. Normally, only tariffs are 
                                                 
11 After the two-year period, a countervailing or anti-dumping duty can be requested for a product 
subject to safeguard measures, although to do so the requirements established by the law must be 
fulfilled.  
 
12 In bilateral trade negotiations there is tension about safeguard disciplines. On the one hand, there 
is interest in supporting a sector that could be affected by the opening. On the other, there is also 
interest in defending the exporters who will be affected by the adoption of safeguard measures. The 
possibility to have the instrument and the compensation clause  provide the construction of a 
politically acceptable balance.  
 
13 In some agreements, there are agricultural safeguards that are automatically applied. For specific 
products, this is the case of the Chile-United States free trade agreement.    22
applied and they have to be the lowest between the level applied when the  liberalization 
program started, and the tariff in force when the safeguard is adopted. Besides, 
compensation equivalent to the trade affected by the safeguard  must be  offered. 
Finally, the terms and conditions to exempt one of the parties from the  application 
of WTO safeguard measures has been considered. This has the effect of decreasing the 
effectiveness of the measure, as it generates incentives to divert trade towards the partner 
that is not affected by a measure. At the same time, it benefits exporters who are 
exempted from the measures 
Therefore, in the safeguards regime applied by Chile, measures have a rather 
limited impact, due to both the general regime and the provisions negotiated in bilateral 
treaties. Its goal is to provide temporary relief as it is difficult to think that in a period of two 
years an industry can make an important economic adjustment. On the other hand, the 
legislation gives a strong signal to industries that suffer more permanent structural 
problems, in the sense that they will not be able to resort to this type of relief to promote an 
adjustment. Chile’s legislation offers more adequate alternatives such as direct support to 
displaced workers. In the long-run, this could derive  in political problems..     23
Table 5: Global Safeguards and Bilateral Agreements  
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Agreement that is part of the Agreement about WTO.
The actions undertaken in agreement with Article XIX of GATT and the Safeguards Agreement are not  
subject to Chapter 19 of the present Treaty.
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(*) As from this investigation they correspond to safeguard measures. 
(**) Safeguard extension dated 22/01/00. For wheat and wheat flour, the measure was terminated 
by DH 244 exempted D.O. 27/07/01 and for vegetable oils, by DH 559 exempted, D.O. 20/11/01 
(***) Safeguard extension dated 08/11/00 
(****) Except imports from Canada, Mexico and Peru 
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  In the 1999 – 2002 period, seven safeguard measures were adopted (Table 6). The 
traditional agricultural sector was the main user of the measures, which have been 
successfully questioned by Argentina and other trading partners in the context of the WTO. 
These questions led to the creation of an Expert Group to analyze the safeguard measures 
that Chile applied to wheat imports in the light of the provisions of the WTO Agreement
14.  
                                                 
14 The Expert Group analyzed two different matters: the price bands system that is applied to wheat, 
wheat flour and vegetable oil imports, and the safeguard measures that benefited these products. 
SEE WT/DS207/R, CHILE-PRICE BAND SYSTEM AND SAFEGUARD MEASURES APPLIED TO 
CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL, WTO. 
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  In this case, the Expert Group ruled against Chile, as it considered that it acted in a 
way that was incompatible with its obligations: i) by not providing the relevant Minutes of 
the sessions held by the Distortions Commission in an adequate means so that they could 
be considered a “published” report; ii) because the Distortions Commission failed to prove 
the existence of an unexpected development of circumstances, and because the report did 
not include grounded findings and conclusions in this respect; iii) because the Distortions 
Commission failed to prove the similarity or direct competition of products manufactured by 
the domestic industry and therefore, it did not identify the domestic industry; iv) because 
contrary to the WTO rules, the Distortions Commission did not prove the increase in 
imports of products subject to safeguard measures;  v)  because the Distortions 
Commission did not prove the existence of a threat of serious injury; vi) because the 
Distortions Commission failed to prove a causal relation; and vii) because the Distortions 
Commission did not make sure that the measures were limited to the measure that was 
necessary to prevent or repair the damage and facilitate the readjustment. Summing-up, 
the safeguard measures were not based on the requirements of Article XIX of GATT 1994 
and the WTO Safeguards Agreement.  
  This shows that even when safeguard measures are applied in a more restrictive 
way than contemplated by the WTO Agreement, this is not a guarantee that the 
requirements of the Agreement are fulfilled. It is not enough to maintain a restricted 
safeguards regime to ensure adequate use of measures. 
Another interesting case refers to the investigation of safeguards for steel imports. 
These safeguards were requested in the context of the safeguard measures adopted by 
the United States, and the adoption or threat of adoption of similar measures by the 
international community. Although measures were exclusively adopted for 3 types of 
specific products, included in 5 tariff items, the application made by the Chilean industry, 
requesting measures for 17 product categories classified in 21 items, was rejected. In this 
case, the opposition of steel product consumers was a determining to moderate the 
pressure for measures in favor of the industry as it showed the negative impact that they 
would have on the exports of manufactured products and consequently, on labor.  
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IV.  Review of the Chilean System 
 
The context in which the Commission was created in 1981 and the type of measures 
adopted by this entity support the idea that the objective of the Commission was to 
alleviate the political pressures generated by the difficult economic situation rather than to 
correct problems originated by the “price distortions of goods.” In the second half of the 
1980’s, the Commission supported the liberalization process that started in 1985. 
  During the decade of the 1990’s and until the present day, this philosophy has been 
maintained. The legislation has undergone modifications to adjust the instruments used to 
support the economic opening and international commitments. However, the use of these 
instruments has developed to target alleged distortions.  
The law has maintained the criterion that measures should be effective for only one 
year and that their renewal entails a de novo investigation procedure, which implies an 
important cost for the applicant. That is also a signal, since the protection offered by this 
legislation is considered to be and is essentially temporary, and exceptional treatments are 
limited in time and in the type of instruments. 
  From the point of view of the operation of the Commission, the entry into effect of 
the WTO meant having to follow its procedures in accordance with the requirements of the 
anti-dumping agreement, and once safeguard legislation was adopted, the corresponding 
WTO agreement. An improvement on the procedures applied by the Commission to 
perform its duties is observed since  its establishment till now. Its analytical methodology 
has been enhanced to fulfill the requirements of WTO agreements, including hearing and 
transparency procedures. Additionally, being subject to the review requirements of WTO 
Committees, the periodic notifications contemplated by the agreements, and the reviews of 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) are also aspects that demand maintaining a 
discipline of the actions of the Commission and its decisions.  
Since formal safeguard legislation was passed, the measures adopted have been 
subject of consultations and even of a panel held by the affected members of the WTO. 
This represents an important disciplinary element for the Commission, which is reviewing 
its procedures in order to improve them. The Commission has recently adopted measures 
to increase transparency and access to information. However, it has not been possible to 
prove the practical scope of these modifications, as there have been no new 
investigations.    27
  Chilean legislation is quite conservative, especially if compared with international 
practice. However, its application has not been free of criticism, and it is necessary to seek 
mechanisms that combine limitations set forth in the law and self-imposed limitations, that 
can change under pressure.  
Some sectors consider that the performance of the Commission is not  timely, as 
they would like the government to take a more decisive initiative to protect the industry 
without having to incur the costs of submitting applications. Additionally, these sectors 
consider that the procedures of the Commission are very slow, and that it reacts late, when 
the damage is already done. This criticism has sometimes been taken up by political 
sectors linked to the agricultural and textile sectors, which have lobbied for a more active 
performance of the Commission in favor of the sectors affected by “unfair competition.”  
On the other hand, both private sector representatives and academic economists 
consider that the safeguards and unfair competition systems are mechanisms that favor 
protectionist sectors which, sheltered by these situations, seek to elude the demands 
generated by the economic  liberalization.  
Although protectionist interests can capture these mechanisms –as is the case of 
many international legislations – that wish to avoid external competition, the Chilean 
experience shows that under certain circumstances, these mechanisms have supported 
the  liberalization process. The crisis that took place at the beginning of the 1980’s put the 
existing model in serious difficulty, so a more pragmatic approach was followed to conduct 
trade policy (Meller,1996). In this context, the creation of a mechanism to temporarily 
alleviate the strong demands for protection was a necessary step in order to continue 
pursuing the strategic goal of economic liberalization. In fact, as of 1985 an economic team 
orientated toward liberalization resumed the tariff reduction process.  In March 1985, tariffs 
were uniformly reduced to 30% and later, in June of the same year, only three months 
later, they were again reduced to 20%. Finally, in January 1988, tariffs were reduced to 
15%. However, even though the tariff reduction affected all sectors equally, a selective and 
temporary protection was established for politically “sensitive” sectors, especially for some 
agricultural products, textiles and shoes,  through the Subsidies and Distortions 
Commissions, and probably through other less known means. Thus, this mechanism had a 
supporting role for the second liberalization process, which started in 1985
15. This situation 
coincides with the arguments of Fischer and Prusa (1999), and Fischer and Osorio (2004), 
in the sense that in the context of negotiations between two or more countries, safeguard 
                                                 
15 The first opening process started in 1973.      28
and/or unfair competition clauses contribute to a more profound opening than the one that 
would be achieved without these mechanisms, and can even increase social welfare under 
certain conditions. In the context of a unilateral opening process as the one which 
prevailed in Chile, the possibility to selectively resort to a temporary protection had the 
same role. 
In the decade of the 1990’s, in the context of a democratic regime subject to 
periodic elections and the  usual pressures of the system, maintaining an open economy 
rendered it more necessary to have a mechanism of this nature, which could grant some 
limited flexibility to conduct economic policy – more so when the system is subject to 
national and international rules that allow the authority to base its decisions on them.  
What explains that Chile had been able to maintain this policy approach under a 
democratic regime, in spite of having undergone a strong economic deceleration process 
since 1998? The Chilean system for safeguards and unfair competition is part of a more 
general economic system. In fact, as Bauer (1998) points out, the Constitution of 1980 
contains a set of economic principles. An important example is that in terms of taxes, the 
legal initiative to establish or modify any tax belongs to the Executive Power. 
Consequently, Congress  members cannot take action in this area out of their own 
initiative. This provision does not prevent the Legislative Power from influencing, or 
seeking to influence tax or tariff matters, since as we have seen, safeguards legislation 
arises from a negotiation between both powers. But it implies that the leadership that the 
economic authority has in customs tariffs matters, supported by Constitutional provisions, 
is key to maintain the orientation of trade policy.  
A second element that has contributed, is the existence of a relatively strong 
consensus on the global benefits of the economic reforms adopted since 1973. This 
means that there is, both in the business and political sectors, a favorable environment for 
economic policies that promote liberalization, although there are specific initiatives against 
it. This has not prevented certain sectors - such as the traditional agriculture sector and to 
a lesser degree the textile and steel industries - from receiving support for their demands 
for more protection from certain political sectors, although so far these demands have 
been limited.  
However, there is scope to improve the Chilean system and grant it a higher level 
of autonomy and transparency. For example, at present the Commission is constituted by 
a majority of governmental representatives or members appointed by political authorities. 
Although in practice this does not mean that the Commission will adopt an active   29
protectionist approach,  there is no guarantee that it will not do so in the future or that it will 
be immune to pressure from interest groups. In fact, there are diverse mechanisms 
through which interested parties seek to exert pressure to influence decisions, such as 
organized demonstrations and even lobby activities.  
Therefore, it is possible to consider modifying the composition of the Commission 
to include representatives appointed by a mechanism that will ensure a higher level of 
autonomy. This is something that occurs in few international experiences and therefore, it 
is relevant to analyze why this mechanism is normally under government control. This 
proposal poses the problem of securing a form of financing so that the Commission can 
have autonomy not only in terms of the  appointment of its members but also, to operate. 
An aspect that must be assessed when considering a higher level of independence is the 
impact that this type of measure can have on international relations. As it was explained, 
when the Distortions Commission started operating, Chile suffered threats of trade 
retaliation if it adopted measures. Therefore, it is also necessary to assess how to 
adequately manage the international dimension of the possibility of greater autonomy for 
the institutionality, especially regarding safeguard mechanisms. 
  An additional aspect refers to the requirement that administrative measures linked 
to definitive determinations are to undergo reviews by courts or arbitration, judiciary or 
administrative procedures, as well as the review of determinations contemplated by the 
WTO Anti-dumping Agreement. In this respect, at present there are several mechanisms in 
Chile by means of which the decisions of the Commission can be reviewed. In the first place, 
one of the roles of the Contraloria General de la República  is to control the administrative 
acts of the Executive Power. A second option is to have recourse to the “ recurso de 
protección,” which is widely used to protect the “economic public order” established by the 
Constitution with respect to private economic rights. This mechanism allows the request of 
an immediate judiciary review on the part of any person who feels that her/his economic 
rights are not respected by the state or by other private agents. The submission of this 
recourse must be immediately reviewed by the corresponding Appellate Court and is used to 
prevent or correct economic damage (see Bauer,1998). 
  However, this review mechanism could be improved by means of a specialized 
instance such as the recently created Competition Court. This is an option that could be 
considered as it would give more support to the decisions adopted by the President with 
respect to the recommendations of the Commission. Besides, it would be a protection 
against lobby actions or other forms of pressure that could be used and that are aimed at   30
influencing the decisions of the Executive Power. Furthermore, the actual composition of the 
Commission could remained unaltered, as it would not be necessary to grant it the higher 
levels of independence proposed before.  
Additionally, the Commission could improve even more in terms of transparency. 
As from the conclusions of the WTO panel, the Commission has worked to correct the its 
procedures, improving the information on the findings and the grounds for its conclusions 
that is available to the public. Access to information has also improved. However, we 
believe that there is more scope for change. For example, the Report of the Technical 
Secretariat could be made public by removing from it those sections that are considered 
confidential by the interested parties. Together with the Minutes of the Commission, where 
the findings and the grounds for decisions are recorded, it could be used to support its 
functioning more effectively and to understand better how it ponders the different 
evidence.   
Finally, the Commission could have a wider approach to review applications. At 
present, a mandatory review of the impact of measures on domestic market competition 
and on consumers or users of the product that is subject to a measure is not incorporated 
in the respective WTO agreements, or in Chilean legislation. Although this can be 
considered, at present there is no obligation to do so and therefore, it is again subject to 
the criterion of the Commission. If we take into account that in many cases where 
measures have been requested the applicant has important market power (for example, 
the sugar, steel and matches sectors), these considerations are particularly relevant.  
The improvements proposed are always limited by the political context of 
democratic regimes, and when we want to improve an instrument of this nature, efforts 
often result in a worse situation. Once more, the leadership role played by economic 
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